UNIT REPORT
No 5

From : 010001 Nov 44
To : 302400 Nov 44

110 Inf Regt

HQ CT 110 INF Regt
032300 Dec 44
P 793543
Consthum, Luxembourg

Maps: 1/50,000 and 1/250,000.

1. ENEMY.

a During period covered this Regt identified elements of the following units opposing it. These identifications were determined from prisoners taken by units in contact with the enemy.

328th Tng Bn, 89th Div
2d Bn, 983d Regt, 275th Div
11th GAF Fortress Bn
3d Bn, 1056th Regt
6th Btry, 275th Arty Regt, 275th Div
982d Regt, 275th Div
77th Inf Regt, 26th VG Div
78th Inf Regt, 26th VG Div
941st Regt, 353d Div
942d Regt, 353d Div
26th Rcn Sqdn, 26th VG Div
3d Bn, 26th Arty Regt, 26th VG Div

b No reports received of any reserves available to the enemy on our front.

c (1) In the area vic RICHELAKAUL, GERMANY, the enemy was defending heavily wooded defensive positions on high ground north of SIMONSKALL, GERMANY, and from the pillbox area, RAFFLDESBRAND, GERMANY to L-007302, supported by an abundance of automatic weapons and entrenched mortars in the area of the enemy pillboxes.

(2) In the area HOSINGER - HOLZHUM - VIANDEN, LUXEMBOURG, the enemy was defending from dug in positions and pillboxes on the high ground east of the OUR river.

d Definite information of the strength of the enemy defenses manned is lacking. His patrols are moderately active, and everyday his patrols are reported crossing the river and making limited advances forward of our MLR. One or two of his outposts established west of the river line have been destroyed by our combat patrols. Of the four prisoners, all deserters, taken in the LUXEMBOURG sector, three were definitely of the "bottom of the barrel" category.

e. Enemy capabilities:

(1) To send strong patrols and/or raiding parties to infiltrate and harass our positions, to capture PW's, to disrupt our communications and supply routes.

CLASSIFICATION
CANCELLED
-1-
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
DOWNGRADED TO CONFIDENTIAL
8 NOV 1945

(2) To interfere with our operations by use of saboteurs and agents operating behind our lines.

2. OWN SITUATION.

a. Front line or most advanced element - See overlay.

b. Location of troops, command posts, boundaries, etc - See overlay.

c. Location of adjacent troops and supporting troops - See overlay.

d. Operations during period 1 Nov 44 to 30 Nov 44:

On 1 Nov 44 the Regt was in the line SE of VASSONACK (Vossenack), GERMANY. Plans were completed for an attack. The day of attack was announced as 2 Nov 44.
On 2 Nov 44 the 2d and 3d Bns crossed LD at 1200 hours. The 1st Bn remained in Div Res. During the attack the assault Bns received heavy mortar and artillery fire, encountered heavily booby trapped defensive positions, pillboxes, dug in wooden bunkers and other prepared defensive positions. They were able to advance about 200 yards.
During the night 2 - 3 Nov 44, enemy patrols tried to infiltrate through the lines and around the flanks. They met with no success.
On the morning of 3 Nov 44, the 2d and 3d Bns again launched an attack. The 1st Bn moved from their assy area positions into the positions formerly held by the 3d Bn. The entire front received heavy mortar and artillery fire. The advance was not great. In the afternoon the 1st Bn received orders and made plans for an enveloping movement around the enemy right (north) flank. A Task Force composed of a plat of Raiders, the mine plat of the Antitank Co, and the Int and Rcn plat of the Regtl Hq Co was organized under the command of 1st Lt Virgil R. Lacy and given the mission of occupying the ground which would be left open by the moving of the 1st Bn. The Task Force became known as Task Force Lacy.
On the morning of 4 Nov 44, the 1st Bn left their positions to move to the LD for the day's operation. By 0510 they had arrived at the LD without incident. At 0700 the 1st Bn crossed the LD which was the road running E and W through VASSONACK. The 2d and 3d Bns put into effect a fire plan and in return received heavy mortar and artillery fire. There was no movement by 2d and 3d Bn. By 0907 the 1st Bn had reached its objectives, the most southern being the town of SIMONSKALL. At 1000 hours the 2d and 3d Bns sent out Rcn patrols which received heavy mortar and small arms fire. At 1345 Co C was ordered to clean out the pocket which had been left by the envelopment. Co E was ordered to assist. At dark Co C buttoned up for the night on its way to complete its mission. During the night plans were laid for the cleaning out of the pocket using Co's C and E in a coordinated drive. They were attached to the 1st Bn for control.
On 5 Nov 44, early in the morning, Co A received a small counter attack which was driven off. Co's C and E moved off and by 1030 had taken three pillboxes and captured thirty prisoners. At 1230 the Regtl Cmdr received orders to have the 3d Bn ready to move by 1600 under Div control. Task Force Lacy was ordered to move to the position held by Co B and Co B was ordered to move half way from their present position to SIMONSKALL. The front lines of the Regtl front received heavy mortar and artillery fire. After capturing the pillboxes, Co's C and E resumed their advance, but became lost in the deep woods and did not accomplish their mission. Plans were laid for Co's C and E to work under control of 2d Bn the next day and to complete their mission.
On 6 Nov 44 at 0200, the 3d Bn under Div control moved out to go to the assistance of the 112th Inf in the town of SCHMIDT. At 0800, Co's C and E

moved off on their assigned mission. By 1415 Co C was tied in with Co A and Co E on their objective. They buttoned up for the night with about a 200 yard gap between Co's E and G.
On 7 Nov 44, at 0630, Co E moved to close the gap between their flank and Co G, and to further clean out the enemy to their front. Co E moved about 200 yards forward and contacted Co G. Co C did not have much success in their attempt to move forward, encountering heavy small arms fire, most of which came from automatic weapons in dug in positions. The enemy tried several times, by counterattack, to break through our lines at various points but failed. The Bns buttoned up for the night at about 1700.
On 8 Nov 44 at 1330, the 2d Bn, about to launch an attack, received a counter attack directed at Co G. The attack was by a force of approximately platoon strength, supported by heavy mortar and artillery fire. Some German prisoners were taken, others killed, a few escaped.
On 9 Nov 44 at 0200, the members of the 3d Bn started to infiltrate back to the Regt, having been greatly disorganized during their engagement near SCHMIDT. At 1000 the Ex O 2d Bn and the S-3 1st Bn coordinated plans to close the gap between 1st and 2d Bns. The gap had become about 500 yards long. By 1800 the Bns were tied in with a small gap between Co's A and C - this gap to be covered by patrols. Both 1st and 2d Bns received heavy mortar and artillery fire during the day.
On 10 Nov 44 at 0700, the 1st and 2d Bns jumped off on an attack. By 0750 F Co had captured one pillbox and had taken some prisoners. Co I was ordered to take over positions held by Co B, leaving Co B free to enter the attack. At about 0900 both Co's C and G ran into heavy fire from a house and pillboxes at RAFFLESBRAN. Co F had taken quite a few prisoners. By 1020 Co I had taken over Co B positions. At 1130 Co G received a small counter attack on its left flank. The attack was repulsed. By 1230 Co B had moved into position in rear of Co C. Co B was to pass through Co C and continue the attack. Co K was ordered to replace Task Force Lacy which was to move NE and protect the left flank of the Regt and coordinate with the 109th Inf. Co L to occupy the position held by Co A, allowing Co A to move into position behind Co B. At 1700, Co B had reached their objective, but were driven off by a counter attack. Co B consolidated with Co C and buttoned up for the night.
On 11 Nov 44 at 0700, the 1st Bn attacked, their mission being to clean out the enemy by an attack from the east. The 2d Bn was to support the attack by fire. The 1st Bn was to attack in a column of Co's. At 1000 they were still engaged with the first pillbox they had encountered. From 0900 to 1030 the 1st and 2d Bns received heavy mortar and artillery fire. At 1300 Co C started an enveloping movement around the left flank. By 1400 Co C had been successful and was digging in. At 1515, Co's A and B tied in with Co C's position, Co's B and C being consolidated due to depleted personnel.
On 12 Nov 44 at 0010, the 1st Bn received a small counter attack. The attack was repulsed. At 0700, Co A launched an attack to drive the enemy from their position. One plat of SP TD's was attached to the Regt and at 0900 fired direct fire into the pillboxes from positions in Co F area. No progress was made, enemy mortar and artillery fire was extremely heavy. The strength of the units was greatly depleted. At 1130 the units were ordered to dig in and hold what they had. At about 1600 the 1st Bn received an attack which drove Co A from its position. At about that time, Capt James H. Burns, S-3 1st Bn, was moving about one hundred replacements forward. He organized them into a provisional company, counter attacked, and reestablished the line. The Bn was very much disorganized, and the position was being held by small organized groups and not by platoons or companies. At about 2000 hours, the 1st and 2d Bns received heavy mortar fire. An attack was planned for the

next day, but due to the depleted strength of the Bns, the movement plan was cancelled though the fire plan was put into effect.
During the night 12 - 13 Nov 44, the 1st Bn Staff and Lt Col Mather, the Regtl Ex O, went to the front lines of the 1st Bn to determine the exact strength and status of the Bn. It seemed to be in a bad way as to strength, physical condition of the men and morale. All Bns received heavy mortar and arty fire throughout the night. In the morning an attempt was made to organize the 1st Bn so that each group would have a definite leader. It was impossible to organize into platoons and companies, but all groups were organized into teams with definite leaders. When the 1st Bn got under way to move to more tactical ground, they received heavy mortar and arty fire and again became disorganized. At 0930 the 1st Bn received an attack. All available mortar and arty was put on the enemy and the attack was stopped. At 1600 the 1st Bn started to withdraw to an assy area in the vicinity of the Bn CP. One plat from Co I was put in position to take over the protection of the left flank of the 2d Bn. It partially occupied the ground given up by the 1st Bn. By 1700 the Regt was buttoned up for the night. Special emphasis was placed on supporting fires for the night as the Regt was not in a good position to repulse a strong counter attack. During the day and night the enemy received reinforcements. The arty and mortar fire greatly increased. At 2130 the enemy attacked against Co G, supported by heavy mortar and light arty fire. SP 75's became very active against 2d and 3d Bns.
On 14 Nov 44 at 0400, the Regt received orders to have a quartering party alerted to move by 0900. At 1000 notice was received to be prepared to meet representatives of CT 13. CT 13 being ordered to relieve CT 110. During the afternoon the 2d Bn received heavy mortar and arty fire.
On 15 Nov 44 at 1300, officers and guides from CT 13 arrived at Regtl CP. They were met by officers from this Regt and oriented on the positions they would occupy and the mechanics of the relief worked out. During the afternoon and night, CT 110 was relieved by CT 13 and moved into a rear assy area in preparation to moving to the vicinity of WILTZ, LUXEMBOURG. The relief was completed by 2300. The Regtl CP closed at 2316.
On 16 Nov 44 at 0630, the 1st Unit of CT 110 crossed Regulating Point enroute to new area. At 1830, Colonel T. A. Seely, Regtl Cmdr, assumed command of new area at CONSTHUM, LUXEMBOURGH. The 32d Cav Sqdn was attached to CT 110. The 2d and 3d Bns were front line - 1st Bn, Div Res, in assy area at FEULEN, LUXEMBOURG. The Regt was to patrol and keep the enemy east of the OUR river, train and rehabilitate. Vigorous patrolling and training were carried out. This continued until the end of the month.

e. Combat efficiency of our command - EXCELLENT.

f. Results of operations covered in this report:
During the 15 day period of fighting in the HURTGEN FOREST, this Regt contained the enemy on a 3000 yard front and gained 3000 square yards of enemy territory. One battalion of enemy infantry was annihilated, many prisoners were captured, and considerable enemy materiel was destroyed. One of our Bns was sent to SCHMIDT to assist our forces fighting there. The above was accomplished while sustaining heavy losses. After moving to the LUXEMBOURG area, we defended a 17 mile front. As a result of vigorous patrolling, the enemy was kept on the east side of the OUR river, and we succeeded in killing ~~many~~ enemy patrols that managed to gain the west bank. We also reorganized the Regt, replaced its losses, and conducted a vigorous period of combat training.

3. ADMINISTRATIVE

a. Strength of command as of 30 Nov 44

Officers	141
Warrant Officers	5
Enlisted Men	2829

Replacements needed

Officers	12
Enlisted Men	220

b. Casualties

Killed in Action	9	Officers
	56	Enlisted Men
Wounded (Evacuated)	40	Officers
	809	Enlisted Men
Missing in Action	5	Officers
	282	Enlisted Men
Captured	0	Officers
	3	Enlisted Men
	1204	Total Battle Casualties
Non-Battle Casualties	23	Officers
	867	Enlisted Men
	890	Total Non-Battle Casualties

c. Prisoners captured and evacuated - 261

d. Evacuation Status - Normal

e. Location of supply and evacuation establishments of interest to Higher Hq.

Date	Map	Rear Echelon	Forward Echelon
Nov 1	Sheet 5203 Germany	883088	VK 907087
Nov 1	Sheet S1 Central Europe 1:200000	956356	VK 989319
Nov 2	No Change	No Change	No Change
Nov 3	No Change	No Change	No Change
Nov 4	No Change	No Change	No Change
Nov 5	No Change	No Change	No Change
Nov 6	No Change	No Change	No Change
Nov 7	No Change	932324	No Change
Nov 8	No Change	No Change	No Change
Nov 9	No Change	No Change	No Change
Nov 10	No Change	No Change	No Change
Nov 11	No Change	No Change	No Change
Nov 12	No Change	No Change	No Change
Nov 13	No Change	No Change	No Change
Nov 14	No Change	No Change	No Change
Nov 15	No Change	No Change	No Change

Nov 16	No Change	No Change	No Change
Nov 17	No Change	No Change	No Change
Nov 18	Sheet 122 France and Belgium 1:50000	738513	VP 794543
Nov 19	No Change	No Change	No Change
Nov 20	No Change	No Change	No Change
Nov 21	No Change	No Change	No Change
Nov 22	No Change	No Change	No Change
Nov 23	No Change	No Change	No Change
Nov 24	No Change	No Change	No Change
Nov 25	No Change	No Change	No Change
Nov 26	No Change	No Change	No Change
Nov 27	No Change	No Change	No Change
Nov 28	No Change	No Change	No Change
Nov 29	No Change	No Change	No Change
Nov 30	No Change	No Change	No Change

f. ClassI "B" - 3074
"K" - 5186
8260 Total on hand as of 30 Nov 44

Class III:	Gallons on Hand		Day's Supply at 50 Mi Per Day
Gasoline V 80		1277 gal required to move org 50 mi	
Gasoline V 80	4930	in veh tanks (est)	3.38 (est)
Gasoline V 80	4295	in cans	3.36
Gasoline V 80	9225	in tanks and cans	7 (est)
Oil SAE 10	225	gallons	30
Oil SAE 30	30	gallons	15
Grease No 1	125		10.4
Grease No 2	100		8
Grease No 4	11		27.5

Class II:	Item	Short
Ordnance	Mortar, 60 mm complete	1
Ordnance	Rifle, auto, cal..30, M1918A2	16
Ordnance	Gun, 57 mm, antitank	1

Class IV: Negative

Class V : CWS 100% Engineer 100% Ordnance 97%

g. Condition of roads and circulation in area of unit.

(1) General Fair
(2) Bridge repairs (General) Good
(3) Road repairs (General) Good

H. E. Fuller

H. E. FULLER,
Colonel, 110th Infantry,
Commanding.

SECRET

HQ CT 110
IN THE FIELD
111500 Nov 1944

Plan of Attack:

Map: 1/25000 sheets 5303 and 5304.

1. Company "G":
Attacks and captures 372 and 372 a. One SP TD will support attack.

2. Company "E":
Attack and capture FG3.

3. Company "F":
Attack and capture 22. One SP TD in support attack.
Attack and capture P2, reducing road block in front of pill-box if necessary one SP TD will support attack. Advance right platoon to South and east from present position toward 111 as diversion.

4. All units will organize for defense immediately after taking objective and prepare against counterattack. Ground captured will be held at all costs.

5. Fire Plan:
a. Arty, 4.2 mortars and 81mm mortars preparatory fires as on opns overlay from H minus 15 to H minus 5.
b. 4.2 mortar smoke areas shown on overlay from H minus 5 to H.
c. 81mm mortars smoke areas shown on overlay from H minus 5 to H.
d. After H hour artillery and mortars harass areas as shown on overlay. Other supporting fires as called for.
e. One Plat of HMG to support attack on 372 and FG-3 from present positions in E Company area.
f. One Plat of HMG to support attack from present position in F Company area by fire in areas of boxes 115, 116 and 118.
g. 60mm mortars of each company to support attack of company by fire on targets selected by company commander.
h. One platoon of Co B 630 TD support attack from present positions by harrassing fire along STECKENBORN - SCHMIDT road and on high ground vicinity of 034296.
i. One platoon 447 AAA to support attack from present position by harassing fire in woods North of STECKENBORN - SCHMIDT road.
j. Three (3) SP TD's support attack on boxes 372, 372 a, 22 and P2 by direct fire in close cooperation with assault teams. ONE SP TD in reserve in vicinity of 007309.
k. Mortars and MG's of 1st Bn support attack from present positions by fire in area of boxes 115, 116 and 118.

SEELY
Comdg

SECRET